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This note will argue that for-profit corporations with religious
objections to same-sex marriage will be unable to use the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to deny benefits to employees'
same-sex spouses if the corporation elects to provide opposite-sex spouses
with benefits under plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). If requiring for-profits to provide benefits to
same-sex spouses is a substantial burden on the corporation's free exercise
of religion, to survive a challenge under the RFRA, the government must
demonstrate that the burden on the person's free exercise is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.' Although the Court likely would conclude that the
for-profits' sincerely held religious beliefs have been burdened, this note
will contend that there is no less restrictive way of furthering the
government's interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
Part II will discuss the evolution of the balancing test found in the
RFRA. It will start with the test's origination in Sherbert v. Verner,2 the
test's rejection in Employment Division v. Smith,3 and the rejection of Smith
and codification of the Sherbert balancing test adopted by the RFRA. This
part will also discuss the protection afforded to for-profit corporations
under the RFRA granted by the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.,4 and discuss arguments for and against granting religious protection to
for-profit corporations.
Part III will discuss United States v. Windsor5 and its effect on the
definition of "spouse" for purposes of federal law. This part will also
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briefly explain the latest guidance federal agencies have given regarding the
definition of "spouse" after Obergefell v. Hodges.6
Part IV will detail the different plans under ERISA and indicate which
plans require that private employers provide benefits for spouses. This part
will also discuss Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) changing stance on sexual orientation
discrimination and a statute recently introduced by Congress to combat
sexual orientation discrimination.
Drawing on the information presented in Part II, Part Il, and Part IV,
Part V will assume that the federal government has taken the position that
private employers who elect to provide spousal benefits under plans
covered by ERISA must provide those benefits to opposite-sex spouses and
same-sex spouses on the same terms. This part will then confront whether
closely held for-profit corporations could successfully challenge the
hypothetical provision's constitutionally under the RFRA, and ultimately
conclude that the challenge would fail.
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 (RFRA)
The protection of the free exercise of religion has a long history in the
United States. This history includes a number of different tests developed
by the Supreme Court and codified by Congress to determine whether a
person's religious freedom has been abridged. Currently, the Court uses the
congressionally mandated test found in the RFRA to determine whether a
person's religious beliefs should be afforded protection from governmental
regulation.7 This section will begin with an overview of the development of
the RFRA and end with a discussion of Hobby Lobby and whether it was
correctly decided.
A. The Evolution of the RFRA
When determining whether a challenged government action violates the
First Amendment's free exercise clause, one of the most frequently cited
cases by the Court is Sherbert v. Verner.8 In Sherbert, the Court held that an
employee, who was fired for refusing to work on the Sabbath of her faith,
could not be denied unemployment benefits by the state of South Carolina,
based on the State's contention that her "refusal to work on Saturdays...
6 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (2015).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a) (2012).
8 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Gonzales v.
0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Com., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of nd
Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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disqualified her for failure to accept suitable work." 9 Reaching this
decision, the Court employed a balancing test in which the State had the
burden of establishing that the substantial infringement on the employee's
right to free exercise was justified by a compelling state interest.'0
Applying the test, the Court first looked at whether a substantial burden
was placed on the employee." The employee had a choice-she could obey
her religion and forfeit unemployment benefits or she could abandon her
religion in order to maintain employment.' 2 The Court found this choice to
be a substantial burden on the woman, holding that "to condition the
availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal
principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties.' 3
Next, the Court required that the State establish a compelling interest to
justify the substantial infringement on the employee's First Amendment
right.' 4 To meet this prong, the Court stated that a mere "rational
relationship to some colorable state interest" would not suffice, rather "only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, [would] give occasion
for permissible limitation."' 15 And here, the Court held that no such "danger
of abuse" was present.' 
6
Finding the absence of a compelling interest, the Court distinguished its
decision from Braunfeld v. Brown.17 In Braunfeld, seven employees of a
large department store disputed the validity of their convictions under South
Carolina's "Sunday Closing Laws" for selling prohibited goods on
Sunday.' 8 The employees argued that, as Orthodox Jewish merchants who
rested on Saturday, closing both Saturday and Sunday threatened the
vitality of their business. 19 The Court held that although the laws made the
employees' practice of religion more expensive, the State's strong interest
in maintaining one uniform day of rest for all outweighed the employees'
burden, and without creating administrative difficulties and competitive
advantages, the best way to serve the State's interest was to declare Sunday
9 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-402.
10 Id. at 403.
1"Id.
12 Id. at 403-04.
13 Id. at 404-06.
14 Id. at 406.
15 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)).
16 Id. at 406-407.
'7 Id. at 408-09 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)).
'" Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600.
19 1d
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as the day of rest.2" Distinguishing its decision, the Sherbert Court
concluded that, unlike in Braunfeld, the State had failed to provide a strong
state interest to justify the denial of the employees' benefits, and thus held
unconstitutional the conditioning of the disbursement of benefits on the
employees' abandonment of their religious convictions21
Almost ten years later, the Court applied the Sherbert analysis in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which parents in an Amish Community challenged
the State's compulsory school attendance law, alleging that the law violated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.22 The parents did not want to
send their children to public school, but instead wished to homeschool their
children on how to be members of their rural community. 23 The Court
agreed with the Amish community, finding the burden substantial because
compulsory education would "endanger if not destroy the Amish's religious
belief., 24 Although action that is adverse to one's religious convictions is
not "totally free from legislative restrictions," the Court held that forcing
Amish children to attend school for two years because of the State's interest
in preparing citizens to "participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system" is not enough to overcome the substantial burden on the
Amish community.
25
Years later, the Court declined to apply the Sherbert balancing test
when it decided Employment Division v. Smith.26 In Smith, Oregon denied
two Native Americans unemployment benefits after they had been fired for
work related misconduct.2 ' The former employees were terminated for
ingesting peyote for religious purposes at a religious ceremony, violating an
Oregon statute that prohibited the use of peyote with "no exception for
sacramental use.",28 Rejecting the Sherbert balancing test, the Court instead
asked whether prohibiting the exercise of religion was the statute's
objective or simply an incidental effect, and held that "if prohibiting the
exercise of religion is not the object ... but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment
has not been offended., 29 Because the Oregon statute was a valid, religion-
20 Id. at 608-609 (Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically
possible, appeared to present an administrative problem of such magnitude, or to
afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement
would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable.)
21 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605
(1961)).
2 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-10 (1972).
23 Id
24 Id. at 219.
25 Id. at 221 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
26 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
27 Id. at 874.
28 Id. at 876 (citing Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P. 2d 146, 148 (1988)).
29 Id. at 877-79.
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neutral law prohibiting conduct that states are free to regulate, the Court
held it constitutional to deny unemployment compensation when the
employees' dismissal results from ingesting peyote for religious purposes.3"
The Smith majority spent considerable time explaining its reasons for
holding the Sherbert test inapplicable to free exercise challenges.3' Of chief
concern to the Court was hindering the government's power to administer
"generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct" by making
that ability dependent upon "measuring the effects of a governmental action
on a religious objector's spiritual development., 32 The Court found that
applying the most exacting scrutiny in this context-which they
characterized as "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws"-to be
inappropriate because such scrutiny is reserved for constitutional norms,
such as the "equality of treatment and unrestricted flow contending
speech. 33 Moreover, the Court stated that a compelling state interest
analysis would result in the Court questioning the "centrality" of religious
beliefs, a practice that the Court has repeatedly held to be inappropriate.
The decision reached in Smith was not welcomed by the legal
community, but was instead seen as a "dramatic attack on religious
liberty., 35 As a result, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) was passed, essentially overturning the Court's holding in Smith
and reinstating the test employed in Sherbert and Yoder. 36 Under the RFRA,
30 Id. at 882, 890.
31 Id. at 882-890.
32 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-
85 (1990) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 485 U.S.
439, 449-451 (1988)).
13 Employment Div., Dep 't of Human Res. of Oregon, at 885-86. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Justice O'Connor rejected this notion, arguing that the text of the
Constitution is clear--"an individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred
constitutional activity .... The First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of
religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a
'constitutional nor[m],' not an 'anomaly."'). The majority responded that strict
scrutiny is reserved for classifications-based on race, the content of speech, or
religion-but that laws neutral on their face to race, religion, or speech that have
the effect of disadvantaging a particular group gave never received strict scrutiny.341d. at 886-87 ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that
courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or
the plausibility of a religious claim."); see, e. g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716, (1981); Presbyterian Church in U.
S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, at
450; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-606 (1979); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 85-87 (1944).")
15 James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution ofAccommodation: Comparing the Unequal
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 125 (Winter 2015).361d. at 125-26.
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the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion," unless the government can demonstrate that the burden "(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." '37
Although in 1997 the Supreme Court held that Congress overstepped its
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted
the RFRA and thus held it inapplicable to the states, the RFRA still controls
federal action.38 In addition, nineteen states have since enacted their own
RFRAs.39
B. Hobby Lobby and the RFRA
In the landmark case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. ,40 the Court
was tasked with determining whether for-profit corporations should be
afforded protection under the RFRA. 4' The action began when three for-
profit corporations sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and other federal agencies and officials, challenging the
contraceptive mandate found in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 (ACA).42 The for-profits objected to the mandate on the
grounds that it violated their religious freedom protected by the RFRA and
the Equal Protection Clause. 43 Specifically, because the for-profits' held the
religious belief that life begins at conception, they could not provide
employees with coverage of four FDA-approved contraceptives that operate
after the fertilization of an egg without substantially burdening their faith. 4
The Court accepted the for-profits' argument under the RFRA and held
HHS's mandate unconstitutional because it substantially burdened the
closely held for-profits' exercise of religion and was not the least restrictive
means of serving the government's compelling interest.4
The RFRA controls government actions that "substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion;, 46 however, the Act fails to define "person."47
Thus, to reach a decision, the Court first had to decide whether for-profit
corporations are "persons" under the RFRA.4 8 To resolve this question, the
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b) (2012).
38 Oleske, supra note 35, at 125-6; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states).
39 Id.
40 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
41 Id. at 2766.




46 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a), (b) (2012).
47 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
4I Id. at 2764-66.
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Court looked to the Dictionary Act,49 which states that "in determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless context indicates otherwise" the
word "person" should be read to "include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals." 50 Therefore, finding no evidence that Congress
intended otherwise, the Court held that corporations are "persons" and are
thus afforded protection under the RFRA. 5'
After establishing corporate religious protection under the RFRA, the
Court next decided whether requiring the for-profits to provide
contraceptives would violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the
companies' owners.52 Because the named for-profits were closely held,
owned, and controlled by a single family with sincere religious beliefs,53 the
Court held that requiring the for-profits to provide contraceptives to their
female employees would substantially burden the for-profits' beliefs.54
Plus, if the for-profits chose not to comply with the ACA, there were huge
financial penalties. 55 And, although alternatively the for-profits could drop
health coverage for employees altogether, the Court ultimately concluded
that by dropping coverage, the for-profits would likely lose skilled workers
who otherwise would have worked for the businesses had the corporations
provided coverage.56
The Court assumed that the government's interest in providing
contraceptives to employees was compelling, but determined that there
were less restrictive means available to further the government's agenda.57
One proposal was for the government to absorb the cost of providing
contraceptives to employees whose employers objected to providing
contraceptives based on their sincerely held religious beliefs; but the Court
49 Id.
50 1 U.S.C. § I (1947).
51 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769) (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 2770.
53 Id. at 2774-75.
54 Id.
" Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775-76 (2014). ("Under
26 U.S.C. §4980D, the companies would be taxed $100 a day for noncompliance
with the mandate. The Court estimated that this would amount to a bill of $475
million per year for $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year
for Mardel. As an alternative, the companies could drop health insurance
altogether, forcing eligible employees to obtain coverage through the programs
established by the ACA, which would result in a $2,000 penalty per employee per
year. The Court estimated the penalties totaling at $26 million for Hobby Lobby,
$1.8 million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.") (citations and quotations
omitted).
56 Id. at 2776-77.
57 ld. at 2780-81.
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ultimately rejected this proposition, finding a better alternative. Instead,
because HHS already had an "accommodation for nonprofit organization[s]
with religious objections,"59 and the same alternatives could feasibly be
made available to for-profit corporations, the Court held that there were less
restrictive means available: to allow for-profit corporations to enjoy the
same accommodations provided to non-profits.60 The Court has now
granted certiorari on whether even this accommodation for nonprofits is
unconstitutional under the RFRA and will answer the question in the
consolidated case, Zubik v. Burwell.
61
Justice Ginsburg wrote a powerful dissent in Hobby Lobby, accusing
the majority of coming to the overly broad and sweeping holding that the
"RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious
beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties
who do not share the corporation owners' religious faith. 62 In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg critiqued the Court's finding that the companies were
substantially burdened and rejected the Court's determination that less
restrictive means were available.63
Of particular importance, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Court's
conclusions that a corporation is a "person" under the RFRA. 64 Rather than
turning to the Dictionary Act, which Justice Ginsburg highlighted only
controls when "context does not indicate otherwise, 65 she directed
attention to the pre-Smith66 "free-exercise caselaw," which offers "no
support for the notion that free exercise rights pertain to for-profit
corporations."' 7 She remarked, "[t]he absence of such precedent is just what
one would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural
58 Id. at 2781 ("[The] RFRA ... in some circumstances require the government to
expend additional funds to accommodate citizens' religious beliefs.") (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2012)).
59 Id. at 2782 (quoting 45 CFR § 147.131 (c)(2); 26 CFR §54.9815-2713A(c)(2))
(citation omitted).60 Id.
61 Zubik v. Burwell, __U.S.- 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), sub nom Geneva Coil. v.
Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015). The
Supreme Court heard oral argument on the issue of whether the "accommodation"
is a substantial burden on nonprofits' religious exercise, in violation of RFRA. See
Oral Argument, Zubik v. Burwell, U.S. _ 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) (No. 14-
1418), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/14-
1418_lbn2.pdf.
62 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 2798-801.
64 Id. at 2793-4.
65 Id. at 2793-4 (citing I U.S.C. § 1) (quotations omitted).
66494 U.S. 872 (1990).
67 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gilardi v.
United States HHS, 733 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
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persons, not artificial legal entities. ' ,68 Justice Ginsburg drew many
distinctions between for-profit corporations and natural persons, churches,
and non-profit organizations to support her argument that the latter named
beings are afforded protection because of characteristics that corporations
do not have nor are they capable of having.
69
Specifically, her dissent argued that corporations are different than
individuals because, unlike natural persons, for-profits "have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires[;] ' ' 70 rather,
corporations are "artificial being[s], invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law.",71 And for-profits differ from churches and non-
profits because of the composition of its members, which Justice Ginsburg
contended is why churches and non-profits receive protection-the First
Amendment protects religious organizations in order to protect the natural
persons who derive meaning from participating in a community that shares
the same religious beliefs.72 As Justice Ginsburg reasoned, it is unlikely that
for-profits are comprised of employees who all subscribe to the same faith,
and for-profits do not exist to protect or promote the individual religious
beliefs of its employees; instead, corporations employ individuals,
regardless of whether they share common religious values, in order to use
their labor for profit.
73
C. Arguments for and Against Personhood of For-Profit
Corporations Under the RFRA
Was the Hobby Lobby majority correct in granting closely held for-
profit corporations protections under the RFRA, or are Justice Ginsburg's
arguments against corporate personhood under the RFRA more
compelling? Corporations are protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 74 Corporations may engage in
protected speech as persons under the First Amendment. And now,
corporations may deny employees contraception based on religious
68 Id. at 2794.
69 Id. at 2794-6.
70 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310,466 (2010)).
" Id. (citing Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)).
72 Id. (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794-97 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
733 F.3d 1208, 1242) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
7' Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (holding corporations have Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures).
71 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding
speech cannot be suppressed based on corporate identity).
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objection under the RFRA.76 The question remains: has the Court granted
for-profits too many protections?
77
In support of the Hobby Lobby78 decision, some contend that for-profits
are rightly protected under the RFRA because modern day corporations'
business purpose and philanthropic goals have become integrated. 79 This
"integralist" perspective views religion as a "comprehensive system" that is
essentially present in all areas of a person's life rather than an "isolated
aspect of human existence."80 It could be said that present day corporations
adopt an integralist view of business and religion because "moral
considerations, and not just profit maximization, have played an
increasingly visible and contested role in the marketplace." 8' In support of
this contention, it should be noted that "many for-profit businesses pursue
charitable or social endeavors; many investors and investment funds cater
to morally and socially conscious aims; and many new corporate forms or
governing rules recognize the role of pursuits beyond narrow profit
seeking."8 2 As Justice Alito observed, "modem corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
Ise, and many do not do so.'S3
However, it should be noted that allowing closely held for-profit
corporations exemptions based on religious objection will impose burdens
on third parties84 Specifically, according to Caroline Corbin, as for-profits
seek exemptions from the law based on religious objection, "corporate
religious liberty will come at the expense of employees' individual religious
liberty. ' 5 Corbin contends that by granting corporate religious liberty, all
employee protections are left vulnerable to religious exemptions,
exacerbating the power imbalance between corporations and employees.8 6
76 Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and Religious Freedom: Hobby Lobby
Stores-A Missed Opportunity to Reconcile a Flawed Law with a Flawed Health
Care System, 48 IND. L. REV. 461, 487 (2015) (discussing the history of the Court's
recognition of corporations as persons).
7' This article does not take a position as to whether the Court wrongly granted
corporations protection under the RFRA, but instead will highlight different
arguments for against the Court's holding in Hobby Lobby.
78 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
" Paul Horwitz, The Supreme Court 2013 Term: The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128
HARV. L. REV. 154, 180-81 (2014).80Id. at 180.81 Id. at 181.
82 Id.
83 id,
84 Oleske, supra note 35, at 13 1-32.
85 Caroline Mala Corbin, Symposium: Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 277, 304 (2015) (questioning other potential healthcare requirements
that corporations may seek to exempt themselves based on religious objection).
8Id. at 305-06.
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She stresses that by enabling corporations to act according to their
conscience, it will make it harder for employees to act according to theirs.87
In response, some argue that although it may be an inconvenience to
employees whose employers act according to their corporate conscience,
society should be equally concerned with the inconvenience to and burden
on corporations who must sacrifice their religious beliefs in order to
accommodate employees.88  Professor Laycock proposes that when
considering the scope of any right to deny same-sex couples service, the
analysis must focus on both the harm to the couple and the harm to the
merchant coerced to provide service. 89 In his view, a merchant's moral
integrity outweighs any inconvenience to the couple that might result from
obtaining the same service from another merchant.90 He states that
"[r]equiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held
moral commitments is far more serious, different in kind and not just in
degree, from mere inconvenience." 91
Conversely, some contend that a corporation's "deeply held religious
beliefs" cannot be violated because corporations lack the human attributes
that justify the protection of individuals' religious liberty.92 Caroline
Corbin contends that there are two justifications for protecting individuals'
religious liberty: the secular justification and religious justification.93 Under
the secular justification, society preserves individual autonomy because
"compelling people to act contrary to their conscience may cause dignitary
harm. 9 4 And the religious justification is based on the desire to allow
religious people to follow their obligations in order to avoid spiritual
harm.95 Persons have the power to love or fear God, and the ability to feel
guilt or shame for acting contrary to their conscience. 96 Corporations, on the
other hand, cannot have emotional responses because they do not have
souls or feelings, and as Corbin contends, are created solely to facilitate
economic growth.9 7
87 Id at 307.
88 Oleske, supra note 35, at 130-32.
89 Id. at 129.
90ld.
91 Id.
I Corbin, supra note 85, at 284-87.
93 Id.
94 Id at 285.
95 Id. at 284.
96 Id at 286.
9' Id. at 284-87; see also Melone, supra note 76, at 488-90 (discussing why
corporations do not have "natural rights" which he proposes as a justification for
protecting individuals rights of free exercise of religion because it is a fundamental
right).
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Similarly, many justifications for protecting churches' religious liberty
do not support the protection of for-profits' religious liberty. Corbin
contends that unlike churches, corporations focus on the corporate
conscience, not individual.9" Further, others argue that religious
organizations exist to advance the interests of members drawn from one
religious community who subscribe to the same religious faith and join
together for a common religious purpose.99 And as Justice Ginsburg pointed
out in her dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby, it is unlikely that employees
of for-profits belong to the same religion or are joined under the for-profit
to promote their individual interests; rather, individuals seek employment
for compensation and for-profits employ individuals in order to turn labor
into profit.' 00
As it follows, some contend that the majority in Hobby Lobby'0 ' drew
an inaccurate distinction between churches and for-profits when it reasoned
that non-profits and for-profit corporations are similar except that for-
profits also make money.'0 2 For-profit corporations are comprised of
shareholders, investors, employees, and officers, whose purposes are to
sustain the operation of the corporation and generate a profit.10 3 These
members are not brought together for a "religious value-based mission;"
rather, they likely have diverse beliefs and are a part of the corporation for
financial gain.' °4 The primary purpose of a corporation is to make money,
not to practice and promulgate religion.'0 5 As some have more frankly
stated, if a for-profit corporation's purpose was not profit, it would be a
non-profit.
06
III. WINDSOR AND THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF "SPOUSE"
This section will begin with a brief discussion of United States v.
Windsor.10 7 Next, it will outline various agency responses to the decision,
focusing on federal agencies' newly adopted definition of "spouse." Lastly,
98 Corbin, supra note 85, at 280-90.
99 Patrick J. McNulty & Adam D. Zenor, Corporate Free Exercise of Religion and
the Interpretation of Congressional Intent: Where Will it End?, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J.
475,495 (2015).
"o Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794-97
(2014).(Ginsburg J., dissenting) (citing Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1242) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
lot 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
102 McNulty, supra note 99, at 495-96.
103 Id at 495-96.
104 Id at 496-97.
105 Corbin, supra note 85, at 293.
106 Id
107 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (holding DOMA unconstitutional).
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the section will touch on the working definition of "spouse" after
Obergefell v. Hodges.'°8
A. United States v. Windsor
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) amended the
Dictionary Act to define "marriage" and "spouse" as explicitly excluding
same-sex partners and spouses as the terms appear in federal statutes.'
0 9
Although this definition did not by its terms restrict State's recognition of
same-sex marriages or civil unions, it did control over 1,000 federal rules
and a number of federal regulations in which marital status is addressed as a
matter of federal law." 0
In 2013, the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA was successfully
challenged in United States v. Windsor. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer
were lawfully married in Canada in 2007, but they continued to be
domiciled in New York City, where Spyer died in 2009. 111 When Spyer
passed away, she left her entire estate to Windsor; but because the
definition of "spouse" under Section 3 of DOMA did not include same-sex
spouses, Windsor was unable to claim the estate tax exemption for
surviving spouses." 2 Windsor paid the tax and subsequently filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA." 13 The Court found
strong evidence that Section 3 of DOMA was motivated by an improper
purpose--"to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma
upon all who enter same-sex marriages"' 4-- and thus held that the Act
108 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
109 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse"
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."); but see
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons protected
by the Fifth Amendment). However, DOMA governed the interpretation of these
words in ERISA itself, DOMA did not control the definition of these terms as they
were found in ERISA-qualified plans. Union Sec. Ins. Co. v. Blakeley, 636 F.3d
275 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that definition of "domestic partner" is determined
preferably by reference to the plan language of the ERISA-govemed life insurance
plan, not the federal common-law definition of "domestic partner").
"o United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
"'. Id. at 2682.; New York recognized same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. Id.
at 2689.
"
2 Id. at 2683.
113 Id.
"14 1d. at 2693
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violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 15
Central to the holding was the Court's position that states have the
power to define marriage as including same-sex spouses and Congress
cannot prohibit states from choosing to honor and dignify those
relationships. 16 The State sought to eliminate inequality, while "DOMA
[wrote] inequality into the entire United States Code.'
The Court found that DOMA's primary purpose was to "identify a
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal."" ' And, by
doing so, the Act was inflicting upon same-sex couples and their families
both dignitary harm and financial harm." 9 As a result of the Act, same-sex
couples were forced to live as married for purposes of state law but
unmarried for purposes of federal law. 20 This created instability and
unpredictability and inflicted unreasonable financial burdens on those
couples.' 2' This disjointed status imposed by the Act not only financially
burdened same-sex couples, but also financially harmed the couples'
children. 122
The Act also undermined the significance of marriage, essentially
treating same-sex marriages as "second-tier marriage[sI.' ' 123 The Court
found that it divested the couples of the duties and responsibilities essential
to married life, demeaned same-sex couples, and told those couples and the
public that same-sex marriages were "unworthy of federal recognition."'
124
By doing so, the Act humiliated "tens of thousands of children" of same-
" I United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
116 Id at 2691-93.
117 1d at 2694.
118 Id
119 Id at 2693-95.
120 Id at 2694.
2' Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) ("It prevents same-sex
married couples from obtaining government healthcare benefits they would
otherwise receive. It deprives them of the Bankruptcy Code's special protections
for domestic-support obligations. It forces them to follow a complicated procedure
to file their state and federal taxes jointly. It prohibits them from being buried
together in veterans' cemeteries.") (citations omitted).
122 Id at 2695 ("It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health
benefits provided by employers to their workers' same-sex spouses. And it denies
or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent,
benefits that are an integral part of family security.") (citations omitted).
123 Id at 2694.
124 Id at 2694-95.
Vol. 10.2
Venturing into Hobby Lobby's Minefield
sex couples and hindered the children's ability to understand the "integrity
and closeness of their own family."'' 25
Because DOMA's purpose was to injure the class that the State sought
to protect and that harm to same-sex couples and their families was so
egregious, the Court held Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 26 As a result, lawful same-sex marriages had to be
recognized for purposes of federal law. 127
B. Response to Windsor
In response to Windsor, the Department of Labor issued Technical
Release No. 2013-04 on September 18, 2013, modifying the definition of
"spouse" and "marriage" to include same-sex marriages for purposes of
federal law. 128 According to the Technical Release, "spouse" now "refer[s]
to any individuals who are lawfully married under any state law, including
individuals married to a person of the same sex who were legally married in
a state that recognizes such marriages, but who are domiciled in a state that
does not recognize such marriages;' ' 129 and "marriage" encompasses "a
same-sex marriage that is legally recognized as a marriage under any state
law."'
1 30
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also quickly responded to Windsor,
issuing Revenue Ruling 2013-17 on August 29, 2013. Consistent with
125 Id. ("The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with
other families in their community and in their daily lives.")
126 Id. at 2695-96.
127 Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013)
128 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE No. 2013-14, GUIDANCE TO
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PLANS ON THE DEFINITION OF "SPOUSE" AND "MARRIAGE"
UNDER ERISA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V.
WINDSOR (2013).
129 Id.
131 Id (emphasis added). However, the Technical Release clarified that "the terms
'spouse' and 'marriage[]'. . .do not include individuals in a formal relationship
recognized by a state that is not denominated a marriage under state law, such as a
domestic partnership or a civil union, regardless of whether the individuals who are
in these relationships have the same fights and responsibilities as those individuals
who are married under state law." Id. On February 25, 2015, the Department of
Labor released a Final Rule to officially hold that the definition of "spouse" under
the Federal Medical Leave Act include same-sex spouses who lawfully celebrated
their marriage in a state which recognizes same-sex marriages ("place of
celebration" rule), updating the old rule which did not recognize same-sex
marriages if the couple was residing in a state that did not recognize same-sex
marriages ("state of residence" rule). 29 C.F.R. §825.102 (2015). Id.; But see infra
note 134.
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Windsor, the IRS announced recognition of same-sex marriages, concluding
that, for federal income tax purposes, the terms "husband and wife,"
"husband," and "wife" should be read to include same-sex spouses. 131 The
IRS also concluded that "[g]ender-neutral terms in the Code that refer to
marital status, such as 'spouse' and 'marriage' include, respectively: (1) an
individual married to a person of the same sex if the couple is lawfully
married under state law, and (2) such a marriage between individuals of the
same sex."'
132
The IRS highlighted several justifications for broadening the definitions
of "spouse" and "marriage" and thus ensuring that similarly situated same-
sex couples and opposite-sex couples are treated in the same manner. 133
One of which was the agency's interest in fostering fairness.1 34 Specifically,
the IRS did not want to unduly burden same-sex couples by forcing them to
comply with a special filing procedure. 135 Additionally, the IRS considered
its own administrative burden in differentiating between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, explaining that the change "fosters administrative
"' Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-2 C.B. 201 ("[F]or Federal tax purposes, the terms
'husband and wife,' 'husband,' and 'wife' include an individual married to a person
of the same sex if they were lawfully married in a state whose laws authorize the
marriage of two individuals of the same sex, and the term 'marriage' includes such
marriages of individuals of the same sex."). However, "[o]n October 23, 2015,
Treasury and the IRS published proposed regulations that reflect the holdings of
Obergefell, Windsor, and Rev. Rul. 2013-17, and that define terms in the Code
describing the marital status of taxpayers." See I.R.S. Notice 2015-86, 2015-52
I.R.B. 887. The proposed regulation states, "[in light of the holdings of Windsor
and Obergefell, the Treasury Department and the IRS have determined that, for
federal tax purposes, marriages of couples of the same-sex should be treated the
same as marriages of couples of the opposite-sex and that, for reasons set forth in
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, terms indicating sex, such as 'husband,' 'wife,' and
'husband and wife,' should be interpreted in a neutral way to include same-sex
spouses as well as opposite-sex spouses. Accordingly, these proposed regulations
amend the current regulations under section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) to provide that, for federal tax purposes, the terms 'spouse,' 'husband,' and
'wife' mean an individual lawfully married to another individual, and the term
'husband and wife' means two individuals lawfully married to each other. These
definitions apply regardless of sex." See 80 Fed. Reg. 64378 (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2015-45_IRB/arO9.html. This proposal, as of the date it is
published as a final regulation in the Federal Registrar, will make Revenue Ruling
2013-17 obsolete. Id. Though, the proposal clarifies that "[t]axpayers may continue
to rely on guidance related to the application of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 to
employee benefit plans and the benefits provided under such plans, including
Notice 2013-61, Notice 2014-37, Notice 2014-19, and Notice 2014-1." Id.; see
discussion infra Part III.C.
132 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, at 4.
133 Id at 5-9.
134 Id at 9.
135 Id at 5.
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efficiency because the Service does not collect or maintain information on
the gender of taxpayers and would have great difficulty administering a
scheme that differentiated between same-sex and opposite-sex married
couples."' 36
Consistent with the IRS and DOL's timely response to Windsor, many
courts also quickly recognized the changing definition of "spouse.' 37 In
Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, the same-sex widow of a deceased law
firm partner and the parents of the partner disputed who was entitled to the
death payment of the partner under an ERISA-qualified plan.' 38 In this
action, the narrow issue was whether Windsor "requires recognition of a
valid Canadian same-sex marriage for purposes of benefits distribution
pursuant to ERISA."' 139 Finding in favor of the surviving spouse, the Court
held that "Windsor makes clear that where a state has recognized a marriage
as valid, the United States Constitution requires that the federal laws and
regulations of this country acknowledge that marriage.'1 40 Therefore,
"where a state recognizes a party as a '[s]urviving [s]pouse,' the federal
government must do the same with respect to ERISA benefits."' 4'
C. "Spouse" in a Post-Obergefell World
In 2015, the Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex
couples may be married on the same terms as opposite-sex couples, thus
requiring that states recognize same-sex marriages. 142 Post-Obergefell, the
IRS and DOL have yet to release any official rules or amendments.
143
136 Id. at 9.
137 See Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, No. 11-0045, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105507, at *19 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
138 Id at *4.
139 Id at *3.
140 Id. at *20-21.
141 Id at *20.
142 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (2015).
143 See TERESA RENAKER, NINA WASOW & JULIE WILENSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
ISSUES AFFECTING EMPLOYEES IN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES, CIVIL UNIONS, AND




that the post-Windsor Guidance provided uniformity prior to Obergefell but it
remains to be seen the issues that may arise Post-Obergefell). The author contends
that "post-Windsor guidance from the IRS and Department of Labor on federal tax
and employee benefit law... is likely to apply to most same-sex couples nationwide
as to employee benefits matters that arise in the future." Id. at 1. However, the
author points out that other "difficult transitional issues" include "how employee
benefit plans will deal with participants in marriage-equivalent relationships
2016
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However, on December 9, 2015, the IRS issued Notice 2015-86 to
"provide guidance on the application of Obergefell."'144 The IRS explained
that because of the Post-Windsor guidance, like Revenue Ruling 2013-1 7
discussed above, which already recognized same-sex marriages for federal
tax purposes, "the Treasury and IRS do not anticipate any significant
impact from Obergefell on the application of federal tax law to employee
benefit plans.' ' 145 Although with respect to health or welfare plans, if a plan
offers benefits to the spouse of a participant, Obergefell could change the
operation of the plan to the extent that it effects the group of spouses
qualified for coverage under the terms of the plan. 46 The IRS provided an
example:
[]If the terms of a health or welfare plan provide that
coverage is offered to the spouse of a participant as defined
under applicable state law, and the plan administrator
determines that applicable state law has expanded to
include same-sex spouses as a result of Obergefell, then the
terms of the plan would require coverage of same-sex
spouses as of the date of the change in applicable state
law. 147
IV. ERISA PLANS AND SPOUSES, AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE VII
This section will discuss plans under The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). It
will conclude by briefly highlighting a discrimination statute proposed but
not yet enacted by Congress, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2013 (ENDA).
A. Plans Covered by ERISA
Whether or not federal law requires that an employer provide spousal
benefits depends on whether the employer is characterized as a private
created by the state prior to Obergefell, such as registered domestic partnerships
and civil unions." Id.; but see supra note 118 and 119.
I "I.R.S. Notice 2015-86, 2015-52 I.R.B. 887 (2015); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2694.
14 I.R.S. Notice, supra note 144, at 2 (emphasis added).
146 Id. at 5.
147 Id at 6 (citing Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241) (the Notice clarified that "[n]o
inference should be drawn from this notice as to the application of any law other
than federal law, including the application of any provisions of the Constitution of
the United States or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the treatment of
same-sex spouses under employee benefits plans.")
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employer (profit-making or nonprofit), governmental employer, or a
church.148 The provisions of ERISA do not apply to governmental plans and
church plans; rather, the provisions of ERISA are generally thought to
apply only to private institutions-both profit seeking and non-profit.
49
Federal law mandates that private employers provide the following plans to
employees: retirement plans, health plans, dependent care assistance plans,
and cafeteria plans.1 50 This section will focus on those four plans and




Retirement plans cover qualified joint and survivor annuities
(QJSA) and qualified preretirement survivor annuities (QPSA). 5 2 In the
case of a married employee, an employer's pension plan must provide
QJSA as the normal form of retirement benefits; however, this may be
waived if both the employee and the employee's spouse consent.'5 3 In the
event a married employee dies prior to retirement, an employer's pension
plan must generally provide QPSA, and it is unlikely this benefit can be
waived.'5 4
148 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1974).
149 id
110 Carol V. Calhoun, Employee benefits effects of Supreme Court same-sex




152 Id. A QJSA is defined as "an annuity for the life of the participant with a
survivor annuity for the life of the spouse." See 26 U.S.C. § 417 (1984) (b). And a
QPSA is defined as "a survivor annuity for the life of the surviving spouse of the
participant if the payments to the surviving spouse under such annuity are not less
than the amounts which would be payable as a survivor annuity under the qualified
joint and survivor annuity under the plan (or the actuarial equivalent thereof)." See
26 U.S.C. 417 § (1984) (c).
' Calhoun, supra note 150.
'54 Id ("While it is theoretically possible for the qualified preretirement annuity to
be waived by consent of the employee and spouse if the cost of such annuity is
borne by the employee's pension benefit, in most instances a plan 'fully subsidizes'
the qualified preretirement survivor annuity, and thus the benefit cannot be
waived.").
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2. Health Plans
Health Plans cover two major types of plans: defined benefits plans
and defined contributions plans. 55 An employer is not required to provide
either type of health plan to employee's spouses, but the employer may
elect to cover spouses) 56 If an employer does not elect to provide spousal
health benefits, the Affordable Care Act will not impose tax penalties on
the employer.157 However, if an employer elects to cover spouses, and the
employee is terminated or the couple legally separates or divorces, then the
spouse, who was previously covered by the employee's health insurance, is
entitled to 36 months of health care continuation (COBRA) at the spouse's
expense. 15
8
3. Dependent Care Assistance Plans
Dependent Care Assistance Plans allow employees to set aside a part of
their pre-tax wages in an account that can be used for employment-related
expenses relating to dependent care services necessary to gainful
employment. 59 They are separate written plans that an employer provides
for the "exclusive benefit" of his employee so long as the employee meets a
number of requirements.160 Expenses the employee spends on his or her
spouse may qualify if the spouse passes the qualifying person test;' 6 1
however, employers are not required to provide benefits for qualifying
spouses. 162 A spouse is considered a qualifying person if he or she "was not
physically or mentally able to care for himself or herself and lived with [the
employee] for more than half the year."' 163 Thus, if an employee's spouse
qualifies, an employer may, but is not required to, provide benefits for the
spouse under a dependent care assistance plan. 64
155 Calhoun, supra note 150; see also 26 U.S.C. 414 (1974); 26 U.S.C. 415 (1974);
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
RETIREMENT PLANS AND ERISA (2015),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faqcompliance_pension.htmil.
156 Calhoun, supra note 150.
157 Id (unlike, if the employer elected not to cover employees, in which case the
ACA would impose tax penalties on the employer).
158 Id.
159 See I.R.C. § 129; see also Ellen Galinksy and James T. Bond, Helping Families
with Young Children Navigate Work and Family Life,
http://www.dol.gov/dolVaboutdol/history/herman/reports/futurework/conference/na
vigate/navigate.htm.
'60 I.R.C. § 129(d)(1) (1981).
161 IRS Pub. 503, at 3 (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p503.pdf.
162 Calhoun, supra note 150.
163 IRS Pub. 503, supra note 161, at 3.
"6 Calhoun, supra note 150.
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4. Cafeteria Plans
Cafeteria Plans are written employer fringe benefit plans that allow
participating employees to choose among two or more benefits consisting
of "cash" and "qualified benefits."' 65 "A cafeteria plan may, but not is not
required to, allow employees to change their elections mid-year based on
certain qualifying events, including marriage and divorce."' 66 A spouse
cannot be an active participant in the plan, but the plan may provide
benefits for the spouse.'
67
B. Title VII and Sex and Sexual Orientation Discrimination
ERISA does not itself prohibit discrimination in the disbursement
of employee benefits; rather, such discrimination is prohibited by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).168 Under Title VII, it is unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against any individual on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."' 69 Title VII applies to employers
who have "fifteen or more employees."' 170 The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the primary agency tasked with
enforcing and interpreting Title VII.' 71 Recently, the EEOC held that
discrimination against an individual because of that individual's sexual
orientation is discrimination because of sex and thus prohibited by Title
VII.
172
165 1.R.C. § 125(a) (1978); see also Cafeteria Plans, Employee Fringe Benefits and
COBRA, 4, http://www.wickenslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Chapter- 14-
Cafeteria-Plans-Employee-Fringe-Benefits-and-COBRA.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2016); (however, "cafeteria plans may avoid being subject to ERISA if each
substantive benefit in the cafeteria plan is a separate written plan satisfying
ERISA".... But "if the cafeteria plan is subject to ERISA, it must comply with
ERISA.").
166 Calhoun, supra note 150; see also Cafeteria Plans, Employee Fringe Benefits
and COBRA, supra note 165, at 6 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.125-4 (2016)).
167 Cafeteria Plans, Employee Fringe Benefits and COBRA, supra note 165, at 5
(citing Prop. Reg. §1.125-1, Q. and A.-4).
168 Roe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 12-cv-04788 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61345, *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S.
85, 91 (1983).
169 42 U.S.C. 2000-e2 (a)(]) (2012).
70 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b) (2012).
' 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-12(a) (2012).
172 See Baldwin v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 120133080 (July 15,
2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0I20133080.pdf. The EEOC's latest
interpretation of Title VII will likely have major implications for ERISA and
whether employers may discriminate against employees on the basis of their
spouse's sex.
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Before the EEOC interpreted Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination, some courts were already beginning to treat sexual
orientation discrimination claims as discrimination on the basis of sex-
prohibited by Title VII." In Hall v. BNSF Ry. Co., two sets of spouses
brought suit against their employers when the employers denied the couples
spousal coverage because "its plan defined marriage as between one man
and one woman and therefore provided coverage only for spouses of the
opposite sex."'174 The employers moved to dismiss the Title VII claims,
asserting that the spouses' discrimination claims were based on sexual
orientation, not sex, which they claimed is not a cognizable claim under
Title VII. 75 The court denied the employers' motion to dismiss, accepting
the employees' view that they experienced adverse employment action
based on sex because, had the employees been the opposite sex of their
spouses, the spousal health benefits would not have been denied.
1 76
Also consider Cote v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, in which the EEOC
released a Final Determination on January 29, 2015.177 Jacqueline Cote was
an employee of Wal-Mart, which provided employees with health insurance
benefits as a part of its compensation packages, with the option of
providing qualified employees' spouses with health insurance coverage.17 8
When Wal-Mart refused to add Cote's same-sex spouse to her health
insurance coverage, Cote filed a complaint with the EEOC against Wal-
Mart, alleging employment discrimination based on her sex in violation of
Title VII. 79 The EEOC investigated the allegations and revealed that when
Cote applied for spousal benefits, Walmart denied the benefit based on their
policy that "individuals eligible for benefits had to be '[a] legal spouse of
the opposite gender.' ,, 80 Although Wal-Mart amended its health benefits
plan in 2014 to "to include same-sex spouses and domestic partners," the
EEOC made a final determination that Wal-Mart violated Title VII because
Cote was subject to "employment discrimination in that she was treated
171 See, e.g., Hall v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-2160 RSM, 2014 WL 4719007, at *3-
4 (citing In re Levenson, 537 F.3d 925 (9th Cir.2009)) (holding employee's denial
of benefits was based on his spouse's sex because if the employee had been the
opposite sex of their spouse, the employee would have been able to add their
spouse as a beneficiary).
174 1 d at *1.
175 Id at *2.
176 Id.
177 See Re: Jacqueline A. Cote v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 523-2014-00916





110 ld (quotations omitted).
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differently and denied benefits because of her sex, since such coverage
would be provided if she were a woman married to a man. '
C. Congressional Response to Sexual Orientation Discrimination
To alleviate concern over discrimination in the workplace based on sex
and sexual orientation, the 113 th Congress has also taken action. The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013 (ENDA) was introduced into
Congress by its drafters on April 25, 2013.82 This Act garnered support for
a period of time, but eventually several major gay-rights activists withdrew
support when ENDA was drafted to include broad religious exemptions for
employers. 83 In withdrawing support, the groups expressed fear that the
religious exemption provisions might encourage for-profits to make
objections similar to those advanced in Hobby Lobby.'84
V. ANALYSIS
As discussed above, the Court held in Hobby Lobby that
corporations are persons for purposes of the RFRA and thus afforded
religious protection.185 There are many arguments for and against this
holding, but it is the Court's current position and must be accepted as
true.' 86 The Hobby Lobby majority clarified that the holding only applied to
closely-held corporations 187 and would not permit discrimination in the
workplace disguised as religious practice-at least not on the basis of
race.188 Justice Ginsburg dissented; the Justice disagreed with the Court's
characterization of the decision as narrow, and instead, accused the majority
of "venturing into a minefield." '189 This analysis will venture into Hobby
Lobby's minefield and determine whether closely held for-profit
corporations could deny same-sex employees' spouses benefits under plans
181 Id.
182 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, 113 t" Cong. S.815, § 6 (2013).
183 Id ("This Act shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational
institution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from the religious
discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.) pursuant to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2000e- (a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) (referred to in this section as a "religious employer");
see also Ed O'Keefe, Gay rights groups withdraw support of ENDA after Hobby




185 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
See discussion supra Part II.C.
187 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
188 Id. at 2783.
189 Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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covered by ERISA by exercising their right to religious protection under the
RFRA granted by Hobby Lobby.
A. The Assumption
Private employers are not required to provide benefits to
employees' spouses under all plans covered by ERISA.' 90 If a spousal
benefit is not required by ERISA, a private employer enjoys the flexibility
to elect to provide spouses with additional coverage.' 91 If a private
employer elects, but is not required, to provide spousal benefits under an
ERISA plan, it is unclear whether ERISA or other laws will require that
coverage be extended to both same-sex spouses and opposite-sex spouses
on the same terms. 192 The answer to this question will largely hinge on how
the Court addresses these issues with respect to employee benefits: Title
VII; 193 Section 510 of ERISA; 194 and state nondiscrimination laws. 195
'
90 See discussion supra Part IV.A. For example, a private employer must provide
spouses with qualified joint and survivor annuities (QJSA) and qualified
preretirement survivor annuities (QPSA), but does not have to provide spouses with
health plans. Id.
191 Id.
192 When spousal benefits are mandated, an employer cannot discriminate because,
after Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), "spouse" is defined under
federal law as a gender neutral term. See discussion supra II B-C.
193 Because providing employee benefits is a term and condition of employment,
benefits cannot be provided in a way that violates Title VII, even if ERISA would
not be violated. See discussion supra Part IV.B. Therefore, where an ERISA plan
elects to include spouses, Title VII will require that the employer include all
spouses, regardless of their sex. Id. This would be consistent with the Department
of Labor's current interpretation of the word "spouse" and "marriage." See
discussion supra Part II.B-C.
194 Section 510 of ERISA is ERISA's anti-discrimination provision and it prohibits
two types of employer actions. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (1974). First, it makes unlawful
for employers to "discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan."
Id. Second, it prohibits employers from taking adverse action to "[interfere] with
the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the
plan." Id. Therefore, Section 510 of ERISA does not cover discrimination in
benefits; rather, it is more likely to address a situation in which an employer fires
an employee in order to avoid providing that employee with benefits. Id. However,
lower courts have varying interpretations of Section 510 of ERISA. See Roe, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61345, at *9-15 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014). One interpretation
comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, holding in
1984 that Section 5 10's protections include "discriminatory modifications" to plans
to intentionally benefit, or injure, certain identified employees or certain groups of
employees. Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 10 17 (1984). This issue was denied certification
by the Supreme Court, Aronson v. Servus Rubber Div. of Chromalloy Am. Corp.
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Resolving those issues, assume that that the federal government has taken
the position that the provisions of ERISA require that private employers
who elect to provide spousal benefits must provide those benefits to
opposite-sex spouses and same-sex spouses on the same terms; could an
employer successfully challenge this requirement under the RFRA?
Emps.'Profit Sharing Plan, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984), but many courts from different
jurisdictions still cite to this construction of Section 510 of ERISA with approval.
See, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 880 F.Supp. 63, 71 (D.Mass.1995); Fischer v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., C.A. NO. 90-8020, C.A. 91-2771 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11395, 66 (1992). A contradictory approach is Roe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue
Shield. 12-cv-04788 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61345 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014). In
Roe, a same-sex couple challenged an employer's insurance plan because, although
the plan did not define "spouse," the plan explicitly excluded same-sex spouses. Id.
at *2 ("Same sex spouses and domestic partners are NOT covered under this
plan."). Employees sought relief for "unlawfully and discriminatorily interfer[ing]
with the attainment of benefits under Section 510 of ERISA." Id. at * 1. The court
dismissed the couple's claim, holding that because Section 510 of ERISA was not
designed to prohibit discrimination-it defers to other federal laws that police
discrimination-and the couple only asserted a discrimination claim under ERISA,
the couple failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Id. at *17-18. So
although Section 510 of ERISA does not currently prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, it is possible that the Court could eventually hold that
Section 510 of ERISA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
with respect to the disbursement of employee benefits.
195 State nondiscrimination laws might make differential treatment of same-sex and
opposite-sex spouses unlawful, but those statutes might be preempted because of
ERISA's preemption clause found in Section 514 of ERISA, which provides that
"the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they.. .relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
ERISA's preemption clause, however, does not result in complete preemption. See
id. Section 514 of ERISA is limited by a number of exceptions, such as state laws
regulating insurance, banking, and securities. 29 U.S.C. §1 144(b)(2). The "savings
clause" gives states the power to regulate ERISA plans indirectly by managing the
terms of insurance policies, see RENAKER, supra note 143, at 19, and state
nondiscrimination laws may prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the provision of insurance. Id. Also, ERISA is not to be construed to
"alter, amend, modify, impair, or supersede" federal laws, like Title VII. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(d). Because complete preemption of state nondiscrimination laws would
impair and modify Title VII by changing the means by which it is enforced, § 514
of ERISA requires partial preemption of state nondiscrimination laws-they are
preempted to the extent that they prohibit more than Title VII prohibits. See Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101-105 (1983). The "deemer" clause, however,
may limit the ability of state nondiscrimination law to reach self-insured employee
benefit plans. A detailed analysis of ERISA preemption is beyond the scope of this
note.
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B. The Application
Under the RFRA, the government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person: "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."'196 For-profit corporations, like natural persons and non-profits, are
protected by the RFRA, and thus the Court's first step will be to determine
whether requiring a closely held for-profit corporation to provide benefits to
same-sex spouses would substantially burden the corporation's sincere
beliefs.
197
The Hobby Lobby majority stated that the RFRA only protects "sincere
religious beliefs" but did not provide guidance as to what constitutes a
"sincere belief;" instead, the decision seemed to indicate that the Court will
defer to the RFRA claimant's judgment.' 98 This may be a result of the
Court's aversion to questioning the sincerity of religious beliefs.' 99 Thus, to
establish sincerity, some contend that all a closely held for-profit must do is
"truthfully assert" that they understand their religious beliefs to disallow
them from providing same-sex spouses with employee benefits. 00 For
example, a for-profit may present evidence of membership in a church that
teaches the sinfulness of same-sex relationships or simply the employer's
demonstrated observance of that principal.20 ' The government may
196 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(a) (2012).
197 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2769-75, 2774, n.4; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)
(2012).
'9' Frederick Gedicks, Symposium: Adjudicating "substantial" burdens,
SCOTUSblog (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:06 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/symposium-adjudicating-substantial-burdens/.
9 See supra P.II.A. (explaining the Court has repeatedly held that courts should
not assess the plausibility of a claimant's religious beliefs).
200 See Alex J. Luchenitser, Symposium: Religious Accommodation in the Age of
Civil Rights: A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions
from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 71 (2015) ("[l]t
appears that all a business's owners need to do is truthfully assert that they believe
that their faith calls on them not to employ persons who have certain characteristics
or engage in certain conduct.").
20 Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of
LGBT Rights 15 (GWU Law School Public Law Research, Paper No. 2015-15,
2015),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2373&context=faculty_
publications, 7 Ala. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Lib. L. Rev. I (forthcoming 2015); see also
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 014 U. ILL. L. REV.
839, 849 (2014) (arguing the liberty interests of both sides of the "culture war"
between supporters of gay rights and abortion and religious objectors). For those
who view marriage as a religious relationship, as apposed to a legal or personal
relationship, same-sex marriage defies church teaching. Id Though some contend
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challenge the sincerity of the for-profit's beliefs by submitting evidence that
demonstrates the for-profit's prior acceptance of employees' same-sex
spouses.20 2 For example, invitations extended to same-sex spouses to office
holiday parties, the for-profit's recognition of an employees' married name
on tax returns or other official documents, a marriage announcement in the
for-profit's company bulletin, or the for-profit's presentation of a wedding
gift to an employee. 203
Once the for-profit "truthfully asserts" the sincerity of its beliefs, ° 4
the employer next must establish that providing same-sex spouses with
benefits is a substantial burden on that belief20 5 To show this is a
substantial burden, the for-profit might argue that by requiring a religious
believer to provide spousal benefits to same-sex spouses, the government is
essentially forcing the religious believer to treat same-sex marriage as valid
when the religious believer views same-sex marriage as invalid. 6 By
forcing the employer with religious beliefs to recognize same-sex
marriages, the for-profit is being denied the right to practice their faith. 7
Like Hobby Lobby, the Court might also consider any penalties associated
employers will need to walk a fine line in establishing religious sincerity;
employers will need to be careful to ensure that employees are respected and
tolerated in the workplace, rather than harassed and name-called, as this would
suggest bigoted animus rather than religious disapproval. Lupu, supra note 201, at
17.
202 Lupu, supra note 201, at 17.
203 See id. at 15-6.
204 Lunchenister, supra note 200, at 71.
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- I (a) (2012).
206 Laycock, supra note 201, at 848 ("The disagreement over marriage equality
begins with a disagreement over the nature of marriage. Marriage is a personal
relationship, a legal relationship, and a religious relationship. The secular side sees
the legal relationship, or the committed personal relationship between the spouses,
as primary. Committed religious believers see the religious relationship as primary.
They see same-sex marriage legislation as the state interfering with the sacred,
changing a religious institution. They reject the change, and they reject the state's
authority to make the change.") (citations omitted).
207 See Helen M. Alvare, A "Bare Purpose to Harm?" Marriage and Catholic
Conscience Post-Windsor I (George Mason Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 14-
14, 2014), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2433741 (arguing
that marriage is central to the teachings of Christianity and Catholicism and
refusing a religious exemption is equivalent of denying them the right to practice
their faith or commanding they practice a new one). Also, the Court has previously
rejected the argument that a law should be held unconstitutional because it makes
the practice of religion more expensive. Braunfeld v. Brown 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(holding that Sunday closing laws were constitutional regardless of the fact that the
laws made it more expense for Orthodox Jewish merchants who rested on Saturday
to run their businesses).
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with violating ERISA.2 °s Ultimately though, because the Court has
historically been unwilling to second-guess religious sincerity, the Court
will likely accept the for-profit's assertion that this kind of complicity
substantially burdens the for-profit's exercise of religious.
2 9
C. Compelling Government Interest
Assuming the Court concludes that the provision substantially burdens
the for-profit's sincere beliefs, the Court next must determine whether there
is a compelling government interest in providing spouses with benefits,
regardless of the sex of the employee's spouse.21
The Government would likely make the argument that there is a
compelling government interest in nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.2 1 1 Just as the Windsor majority relied on the eradication of
discrimination as a justification for invalidating DOMA, so too could the
Court in order to prohibit employers from discriminating against
208 ERISA violations may result in criminal violations and civil violations, but this
is beyond the scope of this article. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ERISA
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/erisaenforcement.html#2 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2016).
209 Lupu, supra note 201, at 17-8: see also supra P.1I.A. (explaining the Court has
repeatedly held that courts should not assess the plausibility of a claimant's
religious beliefs).
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(a) (2012).
211 Although, to the extent of the author, the Court has yet to conclude that
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a compelling state interest, it
is possible that the Court could accept this argument. See Luchenitser, supra note
200, 80-82. The Hobby Lobby majority repudiated the idea that its holding would
protect "discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race," because "[tihe
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to
participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that goal." Elizabeth Sepper,
Symposium: Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 225
(2015) (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. C. at 2783). Justice Ginsburg's dissent pointed
out the holes in the majority's opinion, fearing discrimination on the basis of
religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, race; but the majority only
addressed race discrimination. Id. "In doing so, the Court called into question
whether the governmental has a compelling interest in preventing discrimination on
any other basis." Id.; see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 ("[T]he Attorney
General informed Congress that the President has concluded that given a number of
factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on
sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.)
(quotations omitted); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct.
3244 (1984) ("Acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government
has a compelling interest to prevent -- wholly apart from the point of view such
conduct may transmit.")
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employees' spouses on the basis of sexual orientation.212 Borrowing from
Windsor, the Government could argue that by permitting employers to
discriminate against same-sex couples for purpose of employee benefits,
society is effectively allowing employers to treat same-sex marriages as
"second-class marriages. 213
Further, by allowing the for-profit to discriminate on the basis of a
spouse's sexual orientation, the same-sex couples who have been
discriminated against will suffer unjustifiable harms, both financial and
dignitary. 1 4 As discussed in Windsor, it could be argued that by denying
benefits to same-sex spouses, the for-profit has insulted and violated the
dignity of those employees' commitment to marriage and family life.215
This resulting dignitary harm and financial harm would be suffered not only
by the employees and their spouses, but also by any children or dependents
of the same-sex couples.216 The Court in Obergefell echoed this point
finding that the harm inflicted upon same-sex parents is also suffered by the
children who "suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser. 217
An anti-discrimination argument would also find support in the
evolution of the Court's protection of civil equality and sexual freedom.
First, there is Romer v. Evans, where in 1996 the Court invalidated a
Colorado statute that denied homosexuals and bisexuals protection from
discrimination because it was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 218 And Lawrence v. Texas, where in
2003 the Court invalidated a Texas statute that made it a crime for same-sex
couples to engage in sexual intercourse because the statute violated the Due
212 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
213 Id. at 2693-95 ("[Tlhe primary goal and principal effect of the law was to make
same-sex marriages second-class marriages.") (quotations omitted).214 See Louise Melling, Symposium: Religious Refusals to Public Accommodation
Laws: Four Reasons to Say No., 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 189-90 (2015)
(arguing that anti-discrimination laws are fundamental and public accommodations
should not be denied on the basis of sexual orientation because the denial results in
dignitary harm for the person who is turned away); see also Lupu, supra note 201,
at 11-12 ("Accordingly, the constitutional permissibility of any accommodation of
objecting employees will turn on whether the accommodation can be executed
without material or dignitary harm to same sex couples."); see also Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2695 (2013) (finding Section 3 of DOMA brings financial harm to the
families of same-sex couples because it raises the price of health care by taxing
health benefits by employers to same same-sex spouses and denies or reduces
survivor benefits, "benefits that are an integral part of family security") (citations
omitted)
215 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-96.
216 Id
217 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
218 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 19 Next, in United States v.
Windsor, as discussed above, the Court invalidated Section 3 of DOMA
because it attached a stigma to same-sex couples, making it unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 220 And
most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-
sex couples may be married on the same terms as opposite-sex couples. 22'
This trend signifies a societal interest in affording those of all sexual
orientations with equal rights and lends further support to the government's
compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
D. Least Restrictive Means
It is not enough that the government's provision serves a compelling
government interest.2 22  The Court must also determine whether the
substantial burden is the least restrictive way of furthering that interest. 22
3
As the Court has previously noted, "[t]he least-restrictive means standard is
exceptionally demanding." 224 For example, the Hobby Lobby Court advised
that in some instances the government may need to incur additional
expenses in order to accommodate a person's religious beliefs. 25 A private
employer could argue that a less restrictive way for the government to
achieve its interest would be for the government to provide benefits to those
whose employer refuses to provide same-sex spousal benefits based on
religious objection.2 26 However, it can be surmised that due to the massive
219 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
220 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
221 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
222 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(a) (2012).
223 Id.
224 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) (citing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
225 See id at 2781 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(c)) (2012) (RLUIPA: "[T]his
chapter may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise."). Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) is the RFRA's sister statute. Id.226 See id.; see also Luchenitser, supra note 200, at 70 (explaining the Hobby Lobby
decision) ("The opinion of the five-Justice majority suggested that an alternative
means of satisfying the government's interest of guaranteeing access to
contraceptives was for the government to pay for the contraceptive itself."). To the
extent of the author's knowledge, an argument has not yet been made that an
alternative to satisfying the government's interest would be for the government
itself to pay for same-sex spousal benefit plans under ERISA; however, reading
RLUIPA, the RFRA, and the Hobby Lobby majority, the author contends the Court
might consider this less restrictive alternative in order to "avoid imposing a
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financial burden this plan would place on the government, this proposition
would likely be rejected.
Most importantly though, having the government provide benefits to
those discriminated employees would not remedy the dignitary harm caused
by the discrimination and thus would not serve the government's interest.
Same-sex marriages would still be treated as "second-class marriages. 2 27
Same-sex couples would still suffer a dignitary harm from their employer's
message that they are less worthy.228 This harm would still affect their
children, sending a message to the children of same-sex couples that their
family is different than others-their parent is undeserving of receiving
employee benefits because she is the same sex as her spouse.22 9 The Court
would likely find this unacceptable, and conclude that having the
government provide same-sex spousal benefits would not be a less
restrictive way of serving the government's compelling interest in
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
Thus, it is likely the Court would ultimately hold that the private
employer's argument under the RFRA fails. Although the Court would
probably conclude that government's provision substantially burdens the
for-profit's sincerely held beliefs, the Government has a compelling interest
in preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and there is
no less restrictive means available to serve that interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's latest rulings regarding same-sex marriages have
greatly effected the definition of "spouse" for purposes of federal law. With
this change, it is unclear whether private employers will be required to
provide benefits to same-sex spouses when they elect to cover spouses
under plans covered by ERISA. If the federal government takes the position
that the provisions of ERISA require that private employers who elect to
provide spousal benefits must provide those benefits to opposite-sex
spouses and same-sex spouses on the same terms, it is likely a for-profit
corporation that strongly opposes same-sex marriage for religious purposes
will challenge the provision under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993.230 Though this article concludes that this claim would likely fail.
Although the sincerity of the for-profits' beliefs would be accepted, the
Court would likely conclude that the government's compelling interest in
substantial burden on religious exercise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(c); see also Hobby
Lobby, 134 at 2781.
227 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-94.
228 See sources cited supra note 218.
229 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590 (2015).
230 This article is skeptical of the Court's holding that corporations are persons for
purposes of the RFRA, but accepts it for purposes of analysis.
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prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and thus
requiring private employers who provide spousal benefits under plans
covered by ERISA to both same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples on
the same terms could not be served by less restrictive means.
Discriminating against spouses on the basis of sexual orientation inflicts
harm on both same-sex couples and their children, and this harm cannot be
justified by religious objection.
